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Abstract
Online social media are information resources that can have a transfor-
mative power in society. While the Web was envisioned as an equalizing
force that allows everyone to access information, the digital divide pre-
vents large amounts of people from being present online. Online social
media in particular are prone to gender inequality, an important issue
given the link between social media use and employment. Understanding
gender inequality in social media is a challenging task due to the necessity
of data sources that can provide large-scale measurements across multi-
ple countries. Here we show how the Facebook Gender Divide (FGD), a
metric based on aggregated statistics of more than 1.4 Billion users in 217
countries, explains various aspects of worldwide gender inequality. Our
analysis shows that the FGD encodes gender equality indices in education,
health, and economic opportunity. We find gender differences in network
externalities that suggest that using social media has an added value for
women. Furthermore, we find that low values of the FGD are associated
with increases in economic gender equality. Our results suggest that on-
line social networks, while suffering evident gender imbalance, may lower
the barriers that women have to access informational resources and help
to narrow the economic gender gap.
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The Web was designed to be universally accessible and open, carrying the
promise of equal opportunity in the access to online information and services [1]
as the great potential equalizer [2]. However, despite the widespread adoption
of the Web and other Information Communication Technologies (ICT), online
access is heterogeneously distributed across demographic factors, such as income
and gender –a phenomenon called the digital divide [3, 4, 5].
Governments and global organizations express their concern about the digital
divide, aiming to connect the 4 Billion people that remain offline [6, 7]. However,
the effects of increasing Internet penetration in development are rarely backed up
against empirical data [8], and the latest report by the World Bank suggests that
unequally distributed growth in Internet penetration might exacerbate socio-
economic inequalities [7]. Beyond the divide in the access to Internet, there are
further challenges with respect to digital inequality: the heterogeneity of online
activity and engagement across demographic groups [2].
Among online resources, social media play a key role in economic develop-
ment, for example by providing information that facilitates finding employment
[9, 10]. An important open question is whether equality in the access to so-
cial media can work as a digital provide [11], bringing equality in other social,
political, and economic aspects of society. The World Wide Web Foundation
reports that one of the key elements in the digital divide is gender inequality
[12]. Social media data show the traces of gender inequalities, from content
biases and activity on Wikipedia [13, 14] to visibility and interaction disparities
on Twitter [15, 16, 17] and professional gender gaps in LinkedIn [18]. Empirical
analyses of digital traces has the potential to track more general demographic
patterns [19, 20], such as fertility rates [21].
To properly understand the digital divide, a pervasive problem in cross-
country comparisons is the limited size of country samples and the challenges to
generate unbiased survey data [7]. To overcome this issue, we deployed a system
to collect large-scale data from the Facebook online social network through
its marketing API, as explained more in detail in the Materials and Methods
section. The Facebook marketing API has been useful in previous research to
estimate the value of user data [22], to approximate the size and integration of
migrant populations [23, 24, 25], and to generate estimations of Internet and
mobile phone gender gaps that explain 69% of the variance of ITU measurements
[20]. For our study of the relationship between social media gender divides and
other economic, education, heath, and political gender inequalities, we generated
an anonymous dataset with statistics about the total number of registered users
and daily active users of each gender in each country. While our dataset does
not contain personal information on any individual user, our study covers a total
of 217 countries and more than 1.4 Billion users.
Our dataset allows the quantification of Facebook activity ratios of each
gender in each country. From them, we calculate the Facebook Gender Divide
(FGD) as the logarithm of the ratio between the activity ratios for men and for
women (see Methods for more details). The FGD has a value below zero when
women tend to be more active on Facebook that men, a value close to zero for
equal activity tendencies, and a positive value when men are more active on
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Figure 1: The Facebook Gender Divide across 217 countries. Countries
are colored according their Facebook Gender Divide (FGD), from highly skewed
towards males (red), balanced (blue), and towards females (green, not visible).
The left inset shows the scatter plot of male and female activity ratios across
all countries, revealing a spread along the diagonal. The right inset shows the
histogram of FGD values in bins of width 0.2. While the mode of countries is
slightly below zero, there is significant skewness towards high FGD values. An
online interactive version of this figure can be found in https://dgarcia-eu.
github.io/FacebookGenderDivide/Visualization.html.
Facebook than women in a country. Our computation of the FGD is consistent
with similar measurements constructed from limited survey samples from the
Pew Research Center and the Global Web Index, as we comment in the Methods
section and show in Supplementary Text 1.
Furthemore, the Facebook marketing API allows us to make precise esti-
mates of the Facebook penetration in a country, calculated as the total number
of user accounts (independent of gender and activity) over the total population of
the country. We combine these new measurements with standard socio-economic
indices, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Internet penetration, and
economic inequality, as well as indices from the World Economic Forum Gender
Gap Report that measure gender equality in terms of education, health, political
participation, and economic opportunities [26].
Results
Fig. 1 shows a world map with countries colored according to their FGD,
revealing that many countries are very close to gender equality in Facebook
(blue color). The red scale shows countries with positive FGD–that is, higher
proportion of males on Facebook. The range of values towards FGD below zero
(more tendency for women to be on Facebook) is much narrower than above
zero, as can be seen in the scatter plot with the activity ratios of each gender
(Fig. 1, left inset), and in the skewness of the distribution of FGD across
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countries (Fig. 1, right inset).
Countries with high FGD are located around Africa and South West Asia,
as shown on Fig. 1. This suggests that variations in socio-economic factors
of gender inequality across regions could be explanatory of the FGD. We test
this observation using a linear regression model of the FGD as a function of
the four indices of gender equality measured by the World Economic Forum
(economic opportunity, education, health, and political participation), plus five
non-gender-based controls of Internet penetration, population size, economic in-
equality, Facebook penetration, and mean Facebook active user age (see Meth-
ods). The left panel of Fig. 2 shows the quality of the model fit, comparing
empirical values of FGD rank versus model predictions. Remarkably, the model
can explain well the ranking of FGD (R2 = 0.74), with very few points far from
the diagonal. While this result might be partially explained by Facebook using
vital statistics in their calculations, it is nevertheless consistent with replica-
tions of the model using limited survey samples from the Pew Research center
and the Global Web Index (see Supplementary Text 2). This indicates that the
performance of the model is not an artifact of the Facebook marketing API.
The right panel of Fig. 2 shows the estimate of the coefficients of our model
of FGD. The strongest coefficient is that of education gender equality, which can
also be observed on the colors of the left panel of Fig. 2. Specifically, countries
with high rank in this index have, on average, lower FGD. Health and economic
gender equality also have significant negative coefficient estimates, showing that
the FGD captures more than one type of inequality. Note that the index for
political gender equality does not have a significant relationship with FGD when
the other indices are considered in the model.
Among gender-independent controls, only Internet penetration is negatively
associated with FGD. Nevertheless, the FGD is also correlated with GDP per
capita (Spearman correlation −0.57 , p < 10−6). For that reason, we repeated
the model using GDP as a control variable, finding similar results. These results
evidence that the relationship between gender equality indices and FGD is ob-
servable when development metrics are considered. We present these additional
controls, regression diagnostics, and robustness tests in Supplementary Text 2,
concluding that the negative relationships between FGD and gender equality
indices are robust.
The value of being active in social media might vary across genders, which
we address in a wide country comparison. The general penetration of a commu-
nication channel can increase the value that individuals get for using it, which
is an example of a feedback mechanism driven by (positive) network external-
ities [27], also known as Metcalfe’s law [28]. If there are network externalities
on Facebook, the activity ratio of countries should scale superlinearly with the
Facebook penetration in each country. This scaling relationship with Facebook
penetration might vary for the activity ratios of different genders, which would
signal an additional marginal benefit of using Facebook for one gender.
Fig. 3 shows the scaling relationship per gender between the activity ratio
and the total Facebook penetration in each country. Lines show the result of a
power-law fit between both variables with an intercept and an interaction term
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Figure 2: Regression results of FGD as a function of gender equal-
ity. A) Model predictions versus rank of FGD, where rank 1 is the country
with the highest FGD. The model achieves a high R2 above 0.74, explaining
the majority of the variance of the FGD ranking. Some countries are labeled,
from high FGD (Liberia, India, and Saudi Arabia) to low FGD (Finland, Nor-
way, and Uruguay), as well as some outliers (Dominican Republic, Austria,
and Sri Lanka). B) Coefficient estimates and 95% CI of the terms of the re-
gression fit (excluding intercept). Education (Edu), health (Heal), and eco-
nomic gender equality (Eco) are significantly and negatively associated with
the FGD, but political gender equality (Pol) is not. From the control variables,
Internet penetration (IP) is negatively associated with FGD, but the rest are
not. The main role of education equality in FGD can be observed on panel
A, where dots are colored according to the rank of education gender equal-
ity, showing that countries with low FGD are ranked high on education gender
equality. An online interactive version of this figure can be found in https:
//dgarcia-eu.github.io/FacebookGenderDivide/Visualization.html
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Figure 3: Gender differences in network externalities on Facebook.
Scaling of Facebook activity ratio per gender versus total Facebook penetration.
Solid lines show fit results and shaded areas show their 95% confidence inter-
vals. Both male and female activity ratios grow superlinearly with Facebook
penetration (α > 1), indicating positive network externalities. These network
externalities are stronger for female than for male users (αF > αM ).
for gender. The estimate of the scaling exponent for each gender is clearly above
one for both genders, revealing a superlinear trend consistent with network ex-
ternalities in Facebook. This exponent is significantly stronger for female users
(αF = 1.45 CI=[1.41, 1.49]) than for male users (αM = 1.20 CI=[1.16, 1.24], see
Supplementary Text 3 for details), suggesting that the network externalities in
Facebook are stronger for women than for men.
Given the network externalities shown above, could the FGD be related to
changes in economic gender inequality? We test this possibility by analyzing the
change in FGD and Economic gender equality between 2015 and 2016. We fitted
two regression models, one of changes of Economic gender equality as a function
of FGD (FGD2015 → ∆Eco2016), and the converse one (Eco2015 → ∆FGD2016),
including controls for autocorrelation and GDP as explained in the Methods
section. The coefficient estimates, shown in Fig. 4, reveal a significant positive
relationship between the FGD rank and changes in economic gender inequality,
but not vice versa: there is no significant relationship between Economic gender
equality and the changes in FGD.
The partial R2 value of FGD2015 in the first model is much higher than the
equivalent of Eco2015 in the second model (median bootstrap values of 0.027
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and 0.002 respectively), as shown in the second column of Fig. 4. This suggest
the existence of an association between FGD and changes in Economic gender
equality such that countries with a low value of FGD (i.e. high rank number)
tend more on average to approach economic gender equality. This observation
is consistent across age groups and is robust to the inclusion of further control
variables including socio-economic indicators, other gender equality metrics, and
Hofstede’s culture values [29] (see Supplementary Text 4 for more details). On
the contrary, this association is not observable for education gender inequality,
as a model of ∆Edu2016 shows no significant coefficient for FGD2015.
Discussion
By quantifying the Facebook Gender Divide among 1.4 Billion Facebook users,
we demonstrate a number of phenomena that deserve further investigation. The
FGD is associated with other types of gender inequality, including economic,
health, and education inequality. While the mechanisms behind this connection
and its generalizability to other social media remain as open questions, this
work is an example of how publicly accessible social media data can be used to
understand an important social phenomenon.
Recent reports warn about the possibility that individual Facebook user data
was misused by Cambridge Analytica [30], pointing to general concerns about
privacy in social media. We share those concerns, in particular with respect
to the use of sensitive data in potential conflict with the EU General Data
Protection Regulation [31] and regarding the possible construction of shadow
profiles of non-users [32, 33]. Nevertheless, our results shows that non-personal
data, e.g. anonymous and aggregated data produced by billions of Facebook
users can be used for social good, in particular to understand the issue of gender
inequalities in society at large.
We found evidence of gender-dependent network externalities—that is, women
might receive higher marginal benefit than men from the general adoption of
Facebook in a country. While we only observe traces of this phenomenon at
an aggregate level, in the differences between activity rates across countries,
these results point towards a new research direction: using observational data
to understand the value of social networking sites across demographic attributes.
The FGD provides an inexpensive and accessible way to compute gender
divides in social media that can be tracked over time and across the vast majority
of countries. This allowed us to identify a relationship between the FGD in
2015 and changes in economic gender inequality in 2016. This relationship
could be produced by three mechanisms: i) a causation path between the FGD
and changes in economic gender equality, ii) a more complex causation from
economic gender equality on changes in FGD, or iii) by the prevalence of a
third factor of cultural gender norms that drive both the FGD and economic
gender equality. While we find evidence for the first explanation, we must
note that the real interplay between the FGD and economic gender equality is
probably a combination of all three mechanisms, and only future research with
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Figure 4: Analysis of changes in economic gender equality and FGD.
Coefficient estimates of the regression model of changes in economic gender
equality as a function of FGD and control terms (excluding intercept, top left),
and of the model of changes in FGD as a function of economic gender equality
and control terms (excluding intercept, bottom left). Right panels show the
bootstrap distributions of partial R2 of FGD2015 in the first model and of
Eco2015 in the second one, with dashed vertical lines showing the median R
2
values: 0.027 in the first model and 0.002 in the second one. The FGD explains
changes in economic gender equality much better than economic gender equality
explains changes in the FGD.
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more detailed data can answer how.
Our results show trends across a wide range of countries, but caution should
be taken when extrapolating to the future or when predicating about individual
countries. Before doing so, we need longitudinal models of changes in develop-
ment factors in a wide range of countries, to find the role of the FGD in broader
development sequences that include economic development, health, education,
and inequality [34] before formulating policy suggestions. Nevertheless, our
results allow us to speculate that social media can be an equalizing force that
counteracts other barriers—e.g. those that limit women’s mobility [35]—by pro-
viding access to greater economic opportunities and social capital. In a similar
way as mobile phones increased the life quality of fishermen in India [11], social
media might work as a digital provide that helps disfavored groups despite the
still generalized inequalities in access to ICT and in adoption of social media
technologies.
Materials and methods
The Facebook Global Dataset
We collected the number of Facebook users by age and gender in each country
using the Facebook marketing API [36]. Among other services, this API deliv-
ers data for its commercial customers to provide targeted advertising. When
supplied with a specific target population, the API returns the total audience
size and the price to reach that target audience through Facebook. We iterated
over each combination of age and gender values, retrieving the total number of
users and the number of Daily Active Users (DAU) for each segment in each
country. Our dataset contains the number of male and female registered users
and DAU for all available countries1. After removing entries of small countries
with missing values or low resolution, our dataset contains the total number of
users and DAU segmented by age and gender for 217 countries. Age data in the
API starts at 13, increasing by one year up to a last bin that contains all users
aged 65 or older. We distribute a dataset to allow the replication and extension
of our results through a Github repository2.
Ethical considerations
Our analysis of data from the Facebook marketing API only includes aggregated
public information. Even though the sample includes data from underage Face-
book users, we had no access to any personal identifiable information of any user
and we did not interact or manipulate any research subject. The data retrieval
was performed as part of the TYPES project funded by the European Comis-
sion (GA-653449) and was approved by the Committee of Ethics in Research of
1The API does not deliver data for certain countries, e.g. Syria, Iran, and Cuba.
2https://github.com/dgarcia-eu/FacebookGenderDivide
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the Carlos III University of Madrid (Ethics Report CEI-2015-001). Our anal-
ysis of the data, in line with the growing consensus in ethics [37], is exempted
from ethics review, as agreed by the board of IMDEA Networks and by the
executive office of the Complexity Science Hub Vienna. Nevertheless, following
the guidelines of the Association of Internet Researchers [38], we consider the
possible downstream consequences of our large-scale research. The resolution of
the Facebook marketing API prevents the singling out of individual users, which
makes all our codes useless to identify individuals of any minority or threatened
group. In addition, there is no way to identify the accounts of users and employ
our analysis for any kind of personalization or individual manipulation. From
the onset, our project had the potential to reveal important relationships be-
tween social media use and gender inequalities online and offline. These benefits
greatly outweigh the minimum risks of analyzing this kind of aggregated data
that is accessible to anyone with an Internet connection.
Validating the FGD
Facebook provides the raw data for our study as aggregated values, but as
with any new research method, we should not take it at face value without
comparing it with more established methods. This is of special importance
given the challenges previously found with health-related data from this API
[39].
To validate our measurements, we use three reference survey datasets: the
Global and Internet & Technology surveys of the Pew Research Center 34 and
the survey of the Global Web Index (GWI)5. These datasets allow us to compute
reference measurements of Facebook penetration and FGD for small samples of
countries, to be compared with our calculation of the FGD through the Facebook
marketing API.
The results of this validation exercise are reported in detail in Supplemen-
tary Text 1. We find high correlation coefficients between our measurement of
penetration and the equivalents in GWI and the Pew Global survey, and for
the case of FGD as well. These correlations are as good as the correlations
between survey datasets, showing that the Facebook API data has comparable
quality but a much higher coverage in terms of countries and better temporal
resolution. We find low and non-significant correlations between the absolute
difference between our measurement of FGD and the one from surveys, but
nevertheless add a control for Facebook penetration in our models to make sure
that our results are not an artifact of correlated errors in the quantification of
FGD.
We further compare Facebook penetration across ages groups in the US
through the Pew Internet & Technology survey and the GWI. We find very high
correlations between age-dependent measurements. In addition, we explore how
representative is the FGD for gender divides in other social media, as captured
3http://www.pewglobal.org/dataset/spring-2016-survey-data/
4http://www.pewinternet.org/dataset/march-2016-libraries/
5https://www.globalwebindex.net/
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by the GWI survey. We found moderate yet significant correlations with other
media such as WhatsApp, Twitter, and YouTube. This shows that, while we
should not take Facebook as representative for all social media, there is certain
similarity in gender differences that can motivate future research.
Finally, we test for intra-day oscillations of the measurement of FGD and
Facebook penetration and found extremely consistent values. For the case of
the FGD and the network externalities model, we also repeat our analysis on
monthly snapshots of Facebook data for a period of twelve months between
2015 and 2016, calculating median DAU values each month. This way, we can
confirm the robustness of our analysis to possible temporal changes in the way
Facebook reports data through their API.
Gender equality and development datasets
To normalize the number of active users over the total population of each coun-
try, we use the data collected by the US Census Bureau International Database6.
This dataset contains estimates of the resident population by age and gender
for more than 226 countries. We combine this data with gender equality indices
measured by the World Economic Forum Gender Gap reports of 2015 and 2016
[26]. This dataset quantifies the magnitude of gender equality in 145 countries,
measuring it with respect to four key areas: health, education, economic op-
portunity, and politics. This report updates the values for education, economic,
and political gender equality on a yearly basis, allowing us to measure changes
between 2015 and 2016. To account for additional economic and development
indicators, we include data from the World Bank and the Human Development
Index [40], measuring control variables of GDP (PPP) per capita in 2012, eco-
nomic inequality as the quintile ratio, and Internet penetration.
Computing the Facebook Gender Divide
We quantify the Facebook Gender Divide as a comparison of the rates of activity
between genders. The DAU measures how many users have logged into Face-
book at a given day, which could be either through a Web browser or a mobile
application. We use the segmented data from 13 to 65 years old to normalize the
DAU over the total population of a country in those ages, truncating all data
that is not included in that age range. This way we avoid introducing a bias with
life expectancy and average age. To have a stable estimate of the DAU, we use
as the median value over the month of July 2015, replicating over other months
afterwards. This way, for each country c and gender g ∈ [Female,Male]7, we
have a measurement of the number of active users Ag,c between 13 and 65 years
old. Additionally, this allows us to calculate the mean user age for a country to
include it in our models.
Using the US Census Bureau data, we calculate the total population of each
gender between the ages of 13 and 65 years old in each country, which we
6https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/idb.html
7For simplicity, we take gender as birth sex, i. e. male or female.
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denote as Pg,c. This way, we can normalize the total activity in Facebook over
the population in the same age ranges, calculating the activity ratios Rg,c =
Ag,c/Pg,c. We define the Facebook Gender Divide in country c as
FGDc = log
(
RMale,c
RFemale,c
)
, which compares male and female Facebook activity rates over the population
of country c. A country with positive FGD will have a tendency for men to be
more present on Facebook, while a country with negative FGD will show the
opposite tendency. A country with FGD = 0 will have complete equality in the
activity tendencies of both genders.
We further compute the Facebook penetration as the ratio between user ac-
counts between 13 and 65 years old reported by the API (regardless of activity
and gender) and the total population of the country between those ages.
Regression Models
We model dependencies between gender equality indicators and the FGD as lin-
ear models, after applying a rank transformation to all variables such that rank
1 is the highest possible value of the variable. This way, we explore monotonic
dependencies that do not need to be linear. We define this FGD model as:
FGD = af ·Q+ bf · C + cf + 
where Q is a matrix with the ranks of economic, health, education, and political
gender equality in each country and C contains control variables such as Internet
penetration (IP), income inequality (Ineq), total population (Pop), Facebook
penetration (FBP) and mean user age (Age). cf is the intercept and  denotes
the residuals as the normally distributed, uncorrelated error of the model.
We analyze the relationship between changes and levels in economic gender
equality and of FGD through with two models. First, an equality changes model :
∆Eco2016 = ao · Eco2015 + bo · FGD2015 + co ·O + do + ψo
And second, a FGD changes model :
∆FGD2016 = aq · FGD2015 + bq · Eco2015 + cq ·O + dq + ψq
where ∆Eco2016 and ∆FGD2016 is the change in economic gender inequality
and FGD between 2015 and 2016. Both models include a control for autocor-
relation as a term with the unranked value of the variable in the 2015, and a
main term of the rescaled ranked value of the other variable. Following previous
Economics research on Facebook data [10], we include various ranked controls in
the matrix O, first with a simple correction for GDP, but then with extensions
with other controls as for the FGD model.
We report the coefficient estimates of robust MM regressors for both models.
To compare the effects of one variable over the changes in the other, we first
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residualize the changes by fitting against all controls. Then we compute the
partial R2 value of the conditioning variable when fitting the residualized values.
To understand the uncertainty of this analysis, we bootstrap over 10.000 samples
and report the distribution of R2 values.
We model network externalities as a power-law relationship between the
activity ratio of a gender (Rg,c) and the total Facebook penetration for both
genders together (Pc) in a joint model that includes an intercept for gender and
interaction with gender. We define this way the network externalities model as:
log(Rg,c) = α · log(Pc) + β + δg,Female(αF · log(Pc) + βF ) + φ
where α measures the scaling relationship between the Facebook presence
ratio and the activity ratio of male users, αF the difference in that relationship
for female users, and φ the residuals. The Kronecker delta function δg,Female
takes value 1 when g = Female and 0 otherwise.
All the above models do not show relevant multicollinearity when measuring
Variance Inflation Factors [41].
We report the fit the FGD model and the network externalities model with
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling in JAGS [42]. We also fit all models with
robust regression [43], reporting the results of the changes models in the main
text and of the rest in the Supplementary Information.
To test the validity of the assumptions of our models after fitting, we ver-
ify the normality of residuals through Shapiro-Wilk tests [44], and check that
residuals are uncorrelated with fitted values and independent variables. For the
case of the network externalities model, we additionally analyze multiplicative
residuals in order to test for the possible role of outliers, as shown more in detail
in Supplementary Information.
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Supplementary Text 1 - Validating the FGD
We validate the measurement of the FGD against three reference datasets:
1. Global Web Index (GWI). We use the survey responses of the Global
Web Index 8 panel during the period of our study (the two last quarters
of 2015 and the two first quarters of 2016). For this period, the GWI con-
tains responses from 99,338 panelists in 34 countries, providing rescaled
estimates of survey responses that generalize to the population as a whole.
We take the response to the question about the frequency of use of Face-
book, calculating the weighted fraction of respondents for each gender and
age segment that report to use Facebook daily or more than once a day.
Furthermore, we repeat the analysis for other social media (Whatsapp,
LinkedIn, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube), calculating gender divide
values outside Facebook.
2. Pew Research Center Spring 2016 Global Attitudes (Pew Global).
This dataset includes responses from 23,462 panelists in 19 countries abd
can be found online 9. We use the positive answer rate to question 82 “Do
you ever use online social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter...?” as
way to measure the penetration of SNS in general. We take the respon-
dent weights reported in the dataset to rescale the frequency of positive
responses taking into account the self-reported gender of survey respon-
dents.
3. Pew Research Center Internet & Technology, March 7-April 4,
2016 (Pew US). This US questionnaire 10 includes questions about Face-
book use in particular (act135, “Do you ever use the internet or a mobile
app to use Facebook?”), as well as gender and age data from 1,601 re-
spondents. We use the respondent weights to compute Facebook use rates
across gender and age groups.
Comparison of Facebook penetration estimates
The left panel of Fig. 5 shows the relationship between the total Facebook
penetration for both genders as measured by us through the marketing API
versus the value estimated from the GWI survey. There is a high positive
correlation between both measurements of Facebook Penetration (Pearson 0.89
, CI [0.78, 0.94], Spearman 0.86, CI [0.72, 0.94]). The right panel of Fig. 5
shows the same evaluation against the Pew Global survey. The correlation
between both measurements is positive and high (Pearson: 0.71, CI [0.39, 0.88],
Spearman: 0.77, CI [0.43, 0.94]).
8https://www.globalwebindex.net/
9http://www.pewglobal.org/dataset/spring-2016-survey-data/
10http://www.pewinternet.org/dataset/march-2016-libraries/
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Figure 5: Total Facebook penetration for both genders as reported by the mar-
keting API versus Facebook penetration as estimated in the GWI survey (left)
and penetration of all Social Networking Sites in Pew Global survey (right). The
red dashed line shows a linear regression profile, with its prediction standard
errors in the shaded area.
The left panel of Fig. 6 shows the comparison between estimates based on
GWI and Pew Global survey data. The correlation is also positive and sig-
nificant, even though samples are of limited size (Pearson: 0.63, CI [0.17, 0.86],
Spearman: 0.7, CI [0.38, 0.91]) Both in the right panel of Fig. 5 and in left panel
of Fig. 6, it can be seen that China is a clear outlier. This stems from the dif-
ference between comparing Facebook penetration versus penetration for Social
Networking Sites in general, which is the precise question of the Pew survey.
If we focus on the rest of countries, where we can expect a priori that Face-
book is more representative of social media in general, the correlation reaches
higher values when comparing to the Facebook marketing API (Pearson: 0.84,
CI [0.62, 0.94], Spearman: 0.87, CI [0.66, 0.96]) and to the GWI survey data
(Pearson 0.84, CI [0.55, 0.95], Spearman 0.78, CI [0.43, 0.94]). To make a fair
comparison, we should not include China when comparing Facebook penetration
with penetration in SNS in general.
When we focus only on the set of countries available in all three datasets,
we can compare the correlation of each pair of data sources to assess the va-
lidity of the Facebook API data in terms of Facebook penetration. In this
smaller sample, the Facebook penetration calculated through the marketing API
is highly correlated with both the Pew Global survey values (Pearson: 0.87, CI
[0.64, 0.96], Spearman: 0.86, CI [0.59, 0.97]) and with the GWI survey (Pear-
son: 0.89, CI [0.68, 0.96], Spearman: 0.83, CI [0.53, 0.97]). The point estimates
of these two values are higher than the correlation between the Pew Global
and GWI datasets, as reported above. Nevertheless, these differences are not
significant, as confidence intervals overlap and bootstrap sampling shows that
estimates are indistinguishable (Fig. 5). From this analysis we conclude that
the estimate of Facebook penetration from the marketing API has comparable
quality to the values reported in the high-quality, representative surveys of GWI
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Figure 6: Left: Comparison of GWI Facebook penetration estimate and Pew
penetration of all SNS. The red dashed line shows a linear regression profile,
with its prediction standard errors in the shaded area. Right: Bootstrapping
distributions of Spearman’s correlation coefficient between all pairs of penetra-
tion measurements.
and the Pew Research Center.
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Figure 7: Measurement of the FGD in the API versus estimates using GWI
data (left) and a gender divide for all SNS in PEW (right). The red dashed
line shows a linear regression profile, with its prediction standard errors in the
shaded area.
We calculated surrogates of the FGD based on the GWI and Pew global
survey datasets. The left panel of Fig. 7 shows the comparison of the Facebook
marketing API estimate with the same estimate using GWI data, revealing
high positive correlation (Pearson: 0.83, CI [0.68, 0.91], Spearman: 0.63, CI
[0.27, 0.87]). The right panel of Fig. 7 shows the comparison of the Facebook
marketing API estimate with Pew survey data for all SNS (including China),
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also revealing high positive correlation (Pearson: 0.85, CI [0.65, 0.94], Spearman:
0.74, CI [0.35, 0.91]).
0
1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
G
W
I S
ur
ve
y 
G
en
de
r D
iv
id
e
0
250
500
750
−0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Spearman's correlation
C
ou
nt
GWI, FB API
Pew, FB API
GWI, Pew
Pew Global Survey Gender Divide
Figure 8: Left: Comparison of gender divide measurements in PEW and GWI
data. The red dashed line shows a linear regression profile, with its prediction
standard errors in the shaded area. Right: Bootstrapping distributions of Spear-
man’s correlation coefficient between all pairs of gender divide measurements.
A comparison between estimates of the FGD using GWI versus using Pew
data is shown on the left panel of Fig. 8, also revealing positive correlations
(Pearson: 0.85, CI [0.6, 0.95], Spearman: 0.49, CI [−0.11, 0.86]). As with Face-
book Penetration, the correlation between the FGD using the Facebook market-
ing API and the other two (with Pew: Pearson: 0.77, CI [0.43, 0.92], Spearman:
0.68, CI [0.14, 0.93]; with GWI: Pearson 0.96, CI [0.890.99], Spearman 0.83, CI
[0.47, 0.97]) estimates is comparable to the correlation within estimates, as evi-
denced in bootstrapping samples reported in the right panel of Fig. 8. We can
conclude that the estimate of the FGD using the marketing API is consistent
with GWI and Pew survey metrics, opening the study of the FGD to a much
larger sample of countries.
We measured the absolute difference between the FGD in the marketing
API and in each survey dataset. As expected, the correlation between this
absolute difference and the Facebook penetration across countries is negative
(with GWI: Pearson: −0.3, CI [−0.59, 0.05], p-value= 0.09; with Pew: Pearson:
−0.27, CI [−0.65, 0.21], p-value= 0.26), but its value is weak and not significant.
Nevertheless, we include controls for Facebook penetration in our further anal-
yses, to make sure that our results are not an artifact of a correlation between
penetration and measurement error in the marketing API.
Furthermore, the GWI survey allows us to compare measurements of the
FGD in other social networks with our measure based on the Facebook market-
ing API. We get moderate to high Pearson correlation coefficients with other
sites, such as Whatsapp (0.67, CI [0.43, 0.82]), LinkedIn (0.65, CI [0.40, 0.81]),
Twitter (0.69, CI [0.46, 0.84]), Instagram (0.79, CI [0.62, 0.89]), and YouTube
(0.89, CI [0.79, 0.94]). While we cannot generalize to all social networks based
only on Facebook data, we can see that, to some extent, the difference in activity
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across genders also appears in other SNS. This is particularly interesting when
comparing Facebook, a very private social network, with YouTube or Twitter,
which are much more public but still display substantial correlations in terms
of FGD.
Comparison across age groups
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Figure 9: Comparison of FB presence ratio versus PEW gender categories for
both genders together (left) and gender-wise (center). Replication of the same
validation versus GWI estimates (right).
We compared Facebook penetration estimates in the US across the four age
groups reported in the Pew US dataset. The left panel of Fig. 9 shows the com-
parison for both genders together, which have a Pearson correlation coefficient
of 0.96, CI [0.04, 0.99]. The central panel of Fig. 9 shows the same comparison
by taking the gender-wise estimates, which also have positive Pearson correla-
tion (0.94, CI [0.72, 0.99]). This also appears when surveying the GWI dataset
for US respondents in similar age categories, as shown on the left panel of Fig.
9, which has a high and significant Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.92, CI
[0.69, 0.98]. We can conclude that data provided by the Facebook marketing
API is consistent across ages, but to be sure that our further analyses are ro-
bust we take two action: 1) we add a mean user age control to our regression
models, and 2) we stratify our analyses across age categories, using in each
stratum a measurement of the FGD in the corresponding age range.
Subdaily measurement consistency
We retrieved data from the Facebook marketing API on a daily frequency, start-
ing our retrieval at 3 AM Central European Time. To validate the consistency
of our measurement with any other times of the day, we checked the consistency
of our construction of the FGD with hourly values for 24 hours in December
2017.
Fig. 10 shows the hourly measurement for a sample of large countries, reveal-
ing high consistency with very small fluctuations. When comparing the measure-
ment of the FGD at 3AM CET with any other time in the same day, we get ex-
tremely high pearson correlation coefficients (0.9942654, CI [0.9939277, 0.9945844]),
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Figure 10: Examples of subdaily trajectories of the FGD.
as also evidenced in Fig. 11. This also extends to the measurement of Daily Ac-
tive Users for male (0.9999431, CI [0.9999397, 0.9999462]) and female (0.9999378,
CI [0.9999341, 0.9999412]), as well as the total number of accounts for male
users (0.9999926, CI [0.9999921, 0.9999930]) and female users (0.9999968, CI
[0.9999966, 0.9999970]). Any fluctuation can be attributed to the rounding
that Facebook does to preserve individual user anonymity and to the inter day
changes in the number of Daily Active Users
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Figure 11: Facebook API measurements at different hours of the day. The left
panel shows a comparison of measurements of the FGD for all countries in the
dataset at 3AM CET versus hourly measurements at other times of the day.
The right panels show the comparison between the measurement at 3AM CET
and at other times of the day for the number of DAU and of present users (TOT)
per gender.
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Supplementary Text 2 - FGD as a function of
other inequalities
Regression diagnostics
The Variance Inflation Factors of the variables in the FGD model are below 5,
allowing us to discard collinearity in the linear model of FGD as a function of
other inequalities. Table 1 reports the detailed results of the FGD model fit
and Table 2 reports the results of the same model when fitted with a robust
regression method. Table 3 shows a fit with HC correction for heteroskedasticity.
All results are qualitatively similar, revealing that the FGD model result is
robust to outliers and heteroskedasticity.
Term Median estimate 95% Credible Interval p-value
Intercept 135.8 [119.9, 152.1] p < 0.01
Education Equality Rank −0.54 [−0.67,−0.41] p < 0.01
Health Equality Rank −0.27 [−0.37,−0.17] p < 0.01
Economic Equality Rank −0.16 [−0.27,−0.06] p < 0.01
Political Equality Rank 0.05 [−0.05, 0.14] 0.19
Internet Penetration Rank −0.27 [−0.44,−0.09] p < 0.01
Income Inequality Rank 0.01 [−0.09, 0.10] 0.44
Population Rank 0.01 [−0.09, 0.11] 0.40
Facebook Penetration Rank 0.03 [−0.12, 0.18] 0.33
Mean User Age Rank 0.02 [−0.08, 0.11] 0.33
N 142 R2 0.7417
Table 1: Regression results of FGD model. Estimates of p-values are based on
the posterior of parameter estimates after 10,000 iterations.
Fig. 12 shows the normal Q-Q plot and the histogram of residuals, which are
distributed very close to normality. This is confirmed by a Shapiro-Wilk nor-
mality test, with a statistic of 0.99 and unable to reject the null hypothesis that
residuals are normally distributed (p = 0.63). Furthermore, residuals are un-
correlated with all gender equality variables (Near-zero Pearson correlation co-
efficients, with p-values above 0.9) and the square root of absolute residuals are
not significantly correlated with predicted values. In addition, Facebook pen-
etration is uncorrelated with residuals of the model (Pearson −0.0028, p-value
= 0.97), showing no signs of bias due to the variance of Facebook penetration
rates across countries.
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Term Estimate Standard Error t-value p-value
Intercept 137.4 9.14 15.04 p < 10−10
Education Equality Rank −0.55 0.07 −7.47 p < 10−10
Health Equality Rank −0.29 0.05 −4.98 p < 10−5
Economic Equality Rank −0.13 0.06 −2.03 0.04
Political Equality Rank 0.05 0.05 0.95 0.34
Internet Penetration Rank −0.29 0.10 −2.89 p < 0.01
Income Inequality Rank 0.001 0.05 0.01 0.99
Population Rank −0.003 0.05 0.05 0.96
Facebook Penetration Rank 0.05 0.09 0.62 0.54
Mean User Age Rank 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.84
N 142 Multiple R2 0.6715
Table 2: Robust regression results of FGD model.
Term Estimate 95% HC CI Standard error p-value
Intercept 136.8 [122.5, 151.2] 7.32 p < 10−10
Education Equality Rank −0.54 [−0.68,−0.40] 0.07 p < 10−10
Health Equality Rank −0.27 [−0.36,−0.18] 0.05 p < 10−8
Economic Equality Rank −0.17 [−0.26,−0.07] 0.05 p < 0.001
Political Equality Rank 0.04 [−0.04, 0.13] 0.04 0.32
Internet Penetration Rank −0.27 [−0.44,−0.10] 0.09 p < 0.01
Income Inequality Rank 0.004 [−0.09, 0.10] 0.05 0.92
Population Rank 0.01 [−0.08, 0.10] 0.05 0.87
Facebook Penetration Rank 0.03 [−0.12, 0.18] 0.08 0.7
Mean User Age Rank 0.02 [−0.07, 0.10] 0.04 0.66
Table 3: Coefficient estimates using HC corrected estimates.
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Figure 12: Left: Normal Q-Q plot of residuals of the FGD model. Right:
Histogram of residuals.
The role of GDP
Fig. shows the relationship between the FGD and the GDP per capita. There
is a significant negative correlation between both (Spearman −0.57, p < 10−6),
motivating a replication of the above model with GDP as a control. Since
GDP is highly correlated with Internet Penetration and leads to high Variance
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Figure 13: Relationship between FGD and GDP (log scale).
Inflation, we replace Internet Penetration with GDP in our model. Coefficient
estimates are reported on Fig. 14, revealing that the main result is robust to
controlling for the wealth of countries.
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol GDP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 E
st
im
at
e
Figure 14: Coefficient estimates of the FGD model with GDP instead of Internet
Penetration as control.
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Model stability across monthly measurements
We repeated the fit of the FGD model for measurements of the DAU in twelve
months between 2015 and 2016. Fig. 15 shows the results of the fit for these
alternative periods. The coefficient estimates barely depend on the period when
the DAU are calculated and the R2 of the fits range between 0.727 and 0.758,
confirming that our results are robust to fluctuations in the reporting of DAU
through the Facebook API.
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
08/2015   R² =0.7521
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
09/2015   R² =0.7490
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
10/2015   R² =0.7578
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
11/2015   R² =0.7518
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
12/2015   R² =0.7491
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
01/2016   R² =0.7535
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
02/2016   R² =0.7491
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
03/2016   R² =0.7454 −0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
04/2016   R² =0.737
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
05/2016   R² =0.7349
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
06/2016   R² =0.7313
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
Edu Heal Eco Pol IP Ineq Pop FBP Age
Variable
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t E
st
im
at
e
07/2016   R² =0.7267
Figure 15: Results of repetition of the fit of the FGD model for 12 months
between 2015 and 2016. The results are qualitatively stable across months.
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Model stability across age groups
Figure 16 shows the replication of the model for segments of different age groups.
Results are qualitatively similar to those of the whole population, with signifi-
cant effects of gender equality variables and high R2 values.
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Figure 16: Replication of the model for data segmented into age groups.
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Model test with GWI and Pew approximations to the FGD
We repeated the model using approximations of the FGD using the limited
sample of GWI. The performance of the model is similar, as shown in Figure
17, with R2 = 0.77. While the sample size of GWI is too small to test the role
of all equality variables, the Pearson correlation between the rank of education
equality and the rank of FGD in GWI is −0.52 (p−value < 0.01). Similarly, the
model for the approximation of the FGD with data from Pew for all SNS gives
similar R2 = 0.63 and a significant negative Pearson correlation between the
rank of education equality and the rank of FGD in PEW (−0.73, p − value <
0.001).
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Figure 17: Replication of the model with the GWI estimate of the FGD.
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Supplementary Text 3 - Network externalities
The results of the network externalities model are shown on Fig. 18. The model
achieves a R2 = 0.96 on the logarithmic scale and a R2 = 0.89 on the linear
scale of activity ratios per gender. Table 4 shows the detailed results of the
model, evidencing the superlinear scaling (α = 1.2) and the difference between
genders (αF = 0.25).
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Figure 18: Results of network externalities model fit. The left panel shows
the comparison between empirical and predicted values, the right panel shows
median estimates and 95% CI of model coefficients.
Term Median estimate 95% Credible Interval p-value
β −0.57 [−0.63,−0.50] p < 0.01
α 1.198 [1.16, 1.24] p < 0.01
βF 0.15 [0.06, 0.25] p < 0.01
αF 0.25 [0.2, 0.31] p < 0.01
N 422 (211 countries, 2 genders) R2 0.96
Table 4: Regression results of network externalities model. Estimates of p-
values are based on the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals one for α and
zero for the rest, after 10,000 iterations.
Fig. 19 shows the analysis of the residuals of the model and the error in the
linear scale of activity ratios per gender. Some small deviations from normality
can be observed at the tails, corresponding to significant Shapiro-Wilk statis-
tics of 0.94 and 0.95. Both types of residuals are uncorrelated with Facebook
penetration and do not appear to have a structure across predicted values. We
identified some of the residual outliers, such as China and Tajikistan, which
when removed do not have a qualitative impact in the results of the model fit
and lead to residual distributions closer to normality.
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Figure 19: Analysis of residuals of network externalities model. The top panels
show the normal Q-Q plot and the histogram of residuals φ of the model, and
the lower panels the converse for multiplicative residuals in the linear scale
of activity ratios per gender. Some minor deviations from normality can be
observed in both.
Table 5 shows the results when correcting for heteroskedasticity. All results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
Term Estimate 95% Confidence Interval Standard Error p-value
β −0.57 [−0.61,−0.53] 0.02 p < 10−10
α 1.198 [1.17, 1.23] 0.02 p < 10−10
βF 0.15 [0.07, 0.24] 0.045 p < 0.001
αF 0.25 [0.18, 0.33] 0.038 p < 10
−10
Table 5: HC corrected results of network externalities model.
We repeated the fit using a robust regression method, reporting the results on
Table 6. While estimates slightly change, the qualitative results of a superlinear
relationship that is stronger for female users still hold. This shows that our
conclusions are robust to the influence of outliers.
As with previous models, we evaluated the model of network externalities
over twelve months following our initial measurement. Fig. 20 reports the
overall results, showing no relevant decrease in R2 and generally the same result,
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Term Estimate Standard Error t-value p-value
β −0.523 0.033 −16.25 p < 10−10
α 1.19 0.02 60.88 p < 10−10
βF 0.25 0.05 5.43 p < 10
−7
αF 0.37 0.03 12.59 p < 10
−10
Table 6: Robust regression results of the network externalities model.
where the parameter αF is significantly larger than zero and the parameter α
is significantly larger than one.
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Figure 20: Results of repetition of the fit of the network externalities model for
12 months between 2015 and 2016. The results are qualitatively stable across
months.
We stratified the analysis, fitting the network externalities model using cal-
culations of the FGD using only data from a set of age categories. Fig. 21
shows the model results, evidencing that the female intercept, which measures
the surplus of the exponent for female users, is positive and significant for all
age categories.
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Figure 21: Results of repetition of the fit of the network effects model for age
segments.
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Supplementary Text 4 - Gender equality changes
Table 7 reports the Variance Inflation Factors of the variables in the model
of economic gender equality changes and in the model of changes of FGD. All
factors are low enough to discard multi-collinearity.
∆Eco Model ∆FGD Model
Variable VIF Variable VIF
FGD Rank 1.833 FGD 1.66
Economic Gender Equality 2015 1.276 Rank Economic Gender Equality 2015 1.15
GDP Rank 1.505 GDP Rank 1.493
Table 7: Variance Inflation Factors of independent variables in the economic
gender equality changes model.
Table 8 presents the detailed results of both models of changes. Before
fitting, we rescaled the ranked variables to have a value between zero and one to
allow a better comparison of their relationships, controlling for autocorrelation
by including the unranked value of the variable in the previous year. The results
of Table 8 are confirmed by ANOVA tests of the FGD rank in the ∆Eco model
F = 10.195, p < 0.01, and the non-significant result for the Eco rank in the
∆FGD model F = 0.003, p > 0.9.
∆Eco Model ∆FGD Model
Term Estimate s.e p-value Term Estimate S.e p-value
Intercept -0.011 0.015 0.437 Intercept 0.019 0.010 0.069
FGD Rank 0.039 0.01 < 0.01 FGD -0.002 0.011 0.848
Eco -0.061 0.021 < 0.005 Rank Eco -0.001 0.015 0.94
GDP Rank 0.052 0.01 < 10−6 GDP Rank 0.007 0.015 0.65
Multiple R2 0.1501 Multiple R2 0.0009
Table 8: Results of robust regression for the model of changes in economic
gender equality and of changes in the FGD.
The residuals of the model of changes in economic gender equality are dis-
tributed close to normality, as shown on Fig. 22, with a significant Shapiro-
Wilk statistic of 0.97 and only some small deviations from normality at the
tails. Residuals are uncorrelated with all independent variables and do not
show signs of heteroskedasticity.
We tested the robustness of the positive association between FGD and ∆Eco
in two new fits including the same controls as for the FGD model (VIF of
all factors below 5). The results are shown on Table 9, evidencing that the
observed association between FGD and ∆Eco is robust to other socio-economic
indicators, and to other possible confounds such as Facebook penetration or
mean user age.
We further tested the possible role of other equality indices in the relationship
between FGD and ∆Eco. We added all other three gender equality scores as
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Figure 22: Analysis of residuals of the economic gender equality changes model.
The left panel shows the normal Q-Q plot of residuals of the model, and the right
panel their histogram. Some minor deviations from normality can be observed
in both.
Term Estimate s.e p-value Estimate s.e p-value
Intercept 0.007690 0.018282 0.67473 0.006294 0.017968 0.72667
FGD Rank 0.024313 0.010963 < 0.05 0.026402 0.010911 < 0.05
Eco -0.072524 0.024797 < 0.01 -0.075975 0.024367 < 0.01
Ineq Rank -0.016436 0.007985 < 0.05 -0.013190 0.007922 0.09833
Pop Rank 0.017917 0.008364 < 0.05 0.019372 0.008090 < 0.05
Mean Age Rank 0.005872 0.012132 0.62919 0.006279 0.011781 0.59494
FB Penetration Rank 0.015300 0.013533 0.26029 0.015453 0.012387 0.21442
GDP Rank 0.024484 0.016641 0.14359
Internet Penetration Rank 0.024763 0.015389 0.11000
Multiple R2 0.2009 0.1966
Table 9: Results of the ∆Eco model including additional controls.
controls (VIF below 5), and repeated the fit. The result, shown on Table 10
shows that the positive association between FGD and ∆Eco is robust to the
possible effect of other kinds of gender inequality.
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Term Estimate s.e p-value
Intercept -0.029304 0.021736 0.179917
FGD Rank 0.039560 0.016828 < 0.05
Economic Score -0.043693 0.025742 0.091983
GDP rank 0.045928 0.012187 < 0.001
Education Score rank 0.001291 0.013318 0.922924
Political Score rank 0.014899 0.009621 0.123862
Health Score rank 0.004209 0.009031 0.641953
N 139 Multiple R2 0.171
Table 10: Results of the ∆Eco model including controls for other gender equality
indices.
We tested whether the association between FGD and ∆Eco could be ex-
plained by general cultural differences. We combined our dataset with Hofst-
ede’s cultural dimensions: Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism (IDV),
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), and Masculinity (MAS) (VIF below 5).
This limits the analysis to a set of 66 countries common to both datasets, with
results reported on Table 11. The positive association between FGD and ∆Eco
is still significant, suggesting that the relationship between both variables goes
beyond what Hofstede’s model captures in terms of culture.
Term Estimate s.e p-value
Intercept 0.04743 0.03102 0.1316
FGD Rank 0.03792 0.01764 < 0.05
Eco -0.1243 0.03779 < 0.01
PDI 3.217∗10−4 1.759∗10−4 0.0725
IDV 1.754∗10−4 -1.708∗10−4 0.3088
MAS -2.490∗10−4 1.546∗10−4 0.1126
UAI 3.148∗10−5 1.366∗10−4 0.8185
N 66 Multiple R2 0.362
Table 11: Results of the ∆Eco model including controls for cultural dimensions.
Following the same methodology as for previous models, we stratified our
analysis with FGD measured only in a variety of age groups. The results are
shown on Fig. 23, revealing the positive and significant role of FGD in the
model for all age segments.
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Figure 23: Replication of the model stratifying for different age groups.
Our data offers the opportunity to measure the role of FGD in the changes of
other gender equality measures, but the indices for Political and Health gender
equality have negligible changes between 2015 and 2016. For that reason we can
only evaluate the role of FGD for changes in Education gender equality. We
find no significant effect of FGD, as reported on Table 12.
Term Estimate s.e p-value
Intercept 0.0613210 0.0613210 < 10−7
FGD rank -0.0004546 0.0023720 0.848
Edu -0.0606702 0.0099782 < 10−6
GDP rank -0.0012934 0.0022238 0.562 < 0.01
N 139 Multiple R2 0.08
Table 12: Results of the ∆Edu model.
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